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This document explains the way in which we assign numeric values to different immunity regimes. It begins 
with a brief overview of cross-jurisdictional variation in immunity before turning to the coding rubric, an 
explication of the assumptions made, and three illustrations of how immunity provisions in three countries—the 
United Kingdom, Paraguay, and France—would be coded under this system. 
 
Project Overview 
We seek to quantify the level of protection from criminal prosecution—immunity—across 73 democracies in 
the present and past. We measure the contemporary strength of immunity in each country in order to analyze 
whether immunity correlates with poor governance. We measure the historical strength of immunity in each 
country to measure whether immunity regimes are largely stable over time. We measure the level of protection 
by examining constitutions, legislative documents, and case law. We use our analysis to construct a score based 
on an eighteen-variable rubric that comprises six variables each for legislators, ministers, and chief executives. 
 
Cross-Jurisdictional Variation 
A casual reading of different constitutions reveals substantial differences in the immunity regimes of democratic 
countries. At one end of the spectrum are countries without immunity protection, such as the United Kingdom. 
While members of the British Parliament and British ministers may speak or vote without the threat of legal 
retaliation, no procedural obstacles impede or limit the criminal prosecution of these political actors. 
 
At the other end are countries with strong immunity regimes, such as Paraguay. The Constitution of Paraguay 
stipulates that any arrest or prosecution of a member of the legislature must be authorized by a two-thirds 
majority vote in the legislative chamber to which the legislator belongs. Should prosecutors wish to take action 
against a minister or the president, the lower house of the legislature must first impeach the politician by a two-
thirds vote, followed by a two-thirds majority vote for removal in the Paraguayan Senate. It is within the 
Senate’s sole purview to determine whether the removed politician should be referred to a competent court, 
which may only then proceed with criminal prosecution. Additionally, Paraguayan law grants former presidents 
special legal status through which they retain the procedural protections from prosecution afforded to 
Paraguayan legislators for the remainder of their lifetimes. 
 
Most contemporary democracies employ immunity regimes that lie somewhere between the two extremes of the 
United Kingdom and Paraguay. France approximates a mid-point between the two. French legislators enjoy 
immunity from criminal prosecution for the duration of their mandate, but this immunity may be waived with 
the consent of a legislative committee. French ministers do not enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution. The 
President of France must be removed from office before being prosecuted, a process that requires the consent of 
supermajorities in both houses of the legislature.  
 
These differences among the approaches to immunity in the United Kingdom, Paraguay, and France evince 
significant cross-jurisdictional variation in the strength and nature of immunity regimes throughout the modern 
democratic world. 
 
Immunity of Legislators, Ministers, & Chief Executives 
 
We study the immunity protections afforded to legislators, ministers, and chief executives. This distinction is 
crucial; while some countries protect only legislators from criminal prosecution, others protect only members of 
the executive branch, while others protect all politicians. We derive an aggregate measure of immunity 
protection that incorporates the strength of immunity protections enjoyed by each group of politicians.  
 
A broad measure that incorporates the immunity protections of all three groups has two distinct advantages. 
First, a wider coverage of immunity provisions better captures the interplay among different political actors. It is 
not always possible to identify the extent to which immunity provisions that insulate one set of political actors 
may also influence the effective immunity enjoyed by another, distinct set of political actors. For example, since 
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executive branch members in some countries often enter the legislature after leaving office, the likelihood of 
malfeasant behavior among members of the executive branch may depend to some degree on the strength of the 
country’s legislative immunity regime. Second, governance indices do not measure the performance of each 
individual branch of government, but, rather, throughout the broader public sector. A comprehensive coding of 
immunity protections that includes legislators, ministers, and chief executives most adequately measures the 
degree to which a society has chosen to place its politicians above the law and, therefore, best corresponds to 
aggregative measures of governance. 
 
In addition to the coverage of different kinds of politicians, the key differences between different countries’ 
immunity regimes present themselves along the following lines: (1) the procedure required to lift immunity, 
which can be more or less burdensome; (2) the duration of immunity protection, which can coincide with the 
political office or extend beyond it; (3) the scope of activities covered and the legal actions prohibited by 
immunity. We discuss each in turn. 
1. Procedure: Protection from criminal prosecution, where it exists, may generally be waived if some 
procedural requirement is fulfilled. Jurisdictions with strong immunity protection employ a 
number of burdensome procedural obstacles that must be overcome before a politician can be 
prosecuted. These obstacles are few and undemanding in jurisdictions with weak immunity 
protections. In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that offer their legislators immunity, this 
protection may be waived if either a supermajority or a simple majority of legislators in legislative 
houses to which the legislator in question belongs votes to remove his or her immunity. In 
jurisdictions where immunity protection is not as robust, the procedure for waiving immunity 
requires the consent of only a legislative committee, the cabinet, the chief executive, or the chief 
justice of an appellate court. The immunity of ministers and chief executives is lifted in the same 
way as that of legislators, though the assent of majorities in two legislative houses is occasionally 
required to authorize prosecution in countries with bicameral legislatures. 
2. Duration: Immunity provisions may also differ from one another with respect to the time during 
which they apply. Immunity in most jurisdictions expires at the end of a politician’s term of office. 
Other jurisdictions, however, continue to protect politicians from prosecution after their term of 
office has expired, as is the case with former presidents in Paraguay, who enjoy the same 
immunity as legislators for the remainder of their lifetime. 
3. Scope: Immunity provisions in different jurisdictions provide politicians with varying degrees of 
coverage, which may affect immunity in two ways. First, immunity provisions may limit the 
application of immunity to certain crimes, such as those with some relation to a politician’s official 
duties. The Greek ministerial immunity provision is an example of such laws:  
 
No prosecution against, nor questioning or preliminary questioning of present or former 
members of the Government] . . . for acts carried out by commission or omission in the 
discharge of their duties shall be permitted, before Parliament has decided on this matter.1  
 
The law has been interpreted to provide ministers with protection for public corruption crimes.2 
Alternatively, these provisions may extend further and protect against prosecution for the 
commission of common crimes wholly unrelated to a politician’s official duties, such as the 
legislative immunity clause in the Constitution of El Salvador: “[D]eputies may not be judged for 
serious crimes that they commit except for those cases in which the Legislative Assembly declares 
in advance that there are grounds for prosecution. . . .”3 Such laws have protected politicians from 
prosecution for crimes unrelated to their official duties—even for crimes as serious as homicide.4 
Second, the range of prosecutorial activities that immunity proscribes differs from one jurisdiction 
to another. Some jurisdictions prohibit only the arrest and detention of a legislator, while others 
prevent the opening of judicial proceedings, as well. Ministers and chief executives who have 
immunity may generally not be arrested, detained, or prosecuted without the fulfillment of the 
appropriate procedural requirement. 
 
Scoring Rubric 
We use an eighteen-variable rubric to score immunity provisions and compare their strength across 
different countries. The first six variables apply to legislators, the second six to ministers, and the last six to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 CONST. Greece art. 86, § 2. 
2 See, case of Akis Tsochatzopolous (2011). 
3 CONST. El Salvador, art. 238. Translation is authors’ own.  
4 See, e.g., Juanita Darling, Salvadoran Legislator’s Immunity Upheld, Los Angeles Times (2000). 
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chief executives. In all cases, a value of “1” indicates that the protection is provided by law, while a value of “0” 
indicates that no such protection from criminal liability exists. 
 
Questions 1-3 measure the differences in the procedural requirement necessary to waive legislative immunity. 
Question 4 addresses the duration of legislative immunity protection and distinguishes between regimes in 
which legislative immunity expires at the end of the legislative term and those in which it continues to apply 
beyond the term of office. Questions 5 and 6 refer to the scope of legislative immunity. Question 5 examines the 
types of crimes covered by immunity protection, and question 6 indicates whether immunity also protects 
legislators from judicial proceedings in addition to arrest. 
 
The ways in which we quantify the strength of ministerial and chief executive immunity provisions are identical 
to one another, as immunity provisions applicable to ministers behave in the same way as those that apply to 
chief executives. Questions 7-10 and 13-16 code the essential differences in the procedural difficulty of waiving 
immunity for executive branch members. The requirements for waiving executive branch immunity may involve 
the assent of two legislative houses. Consequently, there exists one supplementary procedural question for 
ministers and chief executives that does not exist for legislators. Questions 11 and 17 code immunity provisions 
that extend beyond the term of office.  Questions 12 and 18 measure the scope of ministerial and chief executive 
















1. Is there a procedural impediment that restricts the detention of a 
legislator on criminal charges? 
2. Is the assent of a simple majority of legislators in one legislative 
house necessary to authorize the detention of a legislator on 
criminal charges? 
3. Is the assent of a supermajority of legislators in one legislative 
house necessary to authorize the detention of a legislator on 
criminal charges? 
4. Do immunity provisions continue to protect legislators after their 
term of office expires? 
5. Do immunity provisions protect legislators from prosecution for the 
commission of common crimes unrelated to official duties? 

















7. Is there a procedural impediment that restricts the prosecution of a 
minister on criminal charges? 
8. Is the assent of a simple majority of legislators in one legislative 
house necessary to authorize the prosecution of a minister on 
criminal charges? 
9. Is the assent of a supermajority of legislators in one legislative 
house necessary to authorize the prosecution of a minister on 
criminal charges? 
10. Is the assent of legislators in two legislative houses necessary to 
authorize the prosecution of a minister on criminal charges? 
11. Do immunity provisions continue to apply protect ministers after 
their term of office expires? 
12. Do immunity provisions protect ministers from prosecution for the 
commission of common crimes unrelated to their official duties? 











13. Is there a procedural impediment that restricts the prosecution of the 
chief executive on criminal charges? 
14. Is the assent of a simple majority of legislators in one legislative 
house necessary to authorize the prosecution of the chief executive 
on criminal charges? 
15. Is the assent of a supermajority of legislators in one legislative 
house necessary to authorize the prosecution of the chief executive 
on criminal charges? 
16. Is the assent of legislators in two legislative houses necessary to 






authorize the prosecution of the chief executive on criminal 
charges? 
17.  Do immunity provisions continue to apply protect the chief 
executive after his/her term of office expires? 
18.  Do immunity provisions protect the chief executive from 
prosecution for the commission of common crimes unrelated to 




The large number of countries that we study necessitates some basic rules, without which empirical comparison 
of law in different jurisdictions would not be possible. 
 
Generally Applicable 
Immunity of Politicians Defined 
We measure immunity from criminal prosecution. For legislators, we measure immunity from criminal 
prosecution for acts unrelated to a legislator’s speech, oral or written, in parliament. Any provision that endows 
officials with immunity from civil suit is not reflected in our empirical scheme. 
Lack of Statutory Guidance 
Where legislation, case law, or parliamentary rules of procedure do not suggest otherwise, no mention of 
immunity from criminal prosecution in a constitution or governing document suggests that there is no immunity. 
Unspecified Majorities 
When an immunity provision requires the consent of some political body but no majority is defined, we 
consider consent to imply a simple majority of the body’s members unless case law or legislation suggests 
otherwise. 
Immunity Conditioned on Penalties 
Some jurisdictions afford politicians immunity from prosecution for criminal activities that carry a penalty of 
incarceration that is fewer than a stipulated number of years; a politician involved in criminal activity that 
carries a penalty of incarceration greater than or equal to the stipulated number of years no longer enjoys 
immunity from criminal prosecution for that act. As the penalties for various public corruption offenses are 
found primarily in criminal codes and sentencing guidelines, the retrieval of which was not possible for some 
jurisdictions, we consider public corruption to be an offense for which the punishment will involve more than 
three years in detention.   
 
Legislative Immunity 
Crimes Committed In Flagrante Delicto 
Nearly all legislative immunity clauses have exceptions for cases in which a legislator is caught in flagrante 
delicto (caught in the act of committing an offense). As this exception is as limited as it is ubiquitous, we ignore 
it for the purposes of measuring immunity. 
Differences Among Houses 
Where the rules governing immunity protection differ between the two houses of a bicameral legislature, as in 
Germany, we consider only the rules applicable to the lower legislative house because of the dominant role of 
the lower house in those jurisdictions.  
Judicial Proceedings 
Where a legislative immunity clause mentions protection from arrest but does not mention protection from the 
opening of judicial proceedings, we assume expressio unius est exclusio alterius and conclude that there is no 
protection from the opening of judicial proceedings. 
Parliamentary Sessions 
Some countries provide legislative immunity only while the legislature is in session. We consider all countries 
as providing criminal immunity to their legislators unless the constitution clearly indicates that immunity 
applies only within the physical bounds of the parliament building and, where applicable, when legislators are 
traveling to or from the parliament building.  
 
Ministerial Immunity 
Members of the Government and Parliamentary Immunity 
When there is no explicit mention of ministerial immunity, parliamentary immunity may apply if ministers who 
are members of parliament continue to exercise the parliamentary mandate. To correct for this potential problem, 
we must infer that in parliamentary systems where there is no mention of ministerial immunity, unless case law 
or some constitutional provision suggests that members of parliament lose their parliamentary mandate upon 
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becoming members of the government, members of the government enjoy the immunity protection of members 
of the parliament when members of the government are generally selected from the parliamentary membership. 
 
Chief Executive Immunity 
Chief Executive Definition 
The chief executive in each country refers to the president in presidential and semi-presidential systems and to 




We measure the level of immunity in historical constitutions in order to gauge the stability of immunity regimes 
over time. Capturing the level of immunity afforded to monarchs or unelected legislatures would interfere with 
the validity of our historical instrument by skewing immunity scores; thus, we assess the level of immunity in 
the earliest available democratic constitution, which we define as the document or practices that governed a 
country when both the executive and legislative branches of government were democratically elected. Where 
early documents were unavailable or unclear, we turned to the next available democratic constitution. For this 
reason, for some countries, the constitution or founding document that we analyzed may not be the earliest 
written governing document. 
Historical Constitutions & Geographic Boundaries 
To take into consideration changes in national boundaries, where a country was previously part of a larger 
democratic entity, we analyze the historical constitution of the larger democratic entity. For this reason, multiple 
countries may share the same historical constitution. For example, we consider the 1920 Constitution of 
Czechoslovakia to be the historical constitution for the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. As colonized 
countries were often not accorded full representation, colonized countries do not assume the historical 
constitution of the democratic colonizing country. 
Retroactivity of Case Law 
In some countries that have been governed by the same constitution for a lengthy period, a constitutional issue 
may have been interpreted only recently. Where case law has interpreted a provision of a constitution that is in 
force today—and that provision, without any lexical changes, was controlling in the first democratic 
constitution—we must presume that the modern interpretation would have been controlling had the case law 
come before the judiciary in the historical period.  
 
Coding Illustration: Three Case Studies 
In order to demonstrate how our coding system functions, we provide examples of coding from the United 
Kingdom, France, and Paraguay. 
 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. The British approach of 
providing politicians with no immunity from criminal prosecution has spread throughout the world—it is found 
largely in common-law countries—and is also used in Australia, Canada, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mauritius, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, and Trinidad and Tobago. The Constitution of the 
United Kingdom does not exist as a single document and, instead, comprises a number of traditions, judicial 
cases, and legislative acts that date to the Glorious Revolution. While we do consult statutes, we rely heavily on 
secondary sources for information on impediments to the criminal prosecution of British politicians. 
Contemporary Legislative Immunity 
 Relevant Provisions/Sources 
 
Bill of Rights (1689), art. IX: “…the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament 
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.” 
Parliamentary Privilege Act (1770), art. 1, 2. “After 24 June, 1770, Suits may be prosecuted in Courts 
of Record, Equity, or Admiralty, and Courts having Cognizance of Causes Matrimonial and 
Testamentary, against Peers, and Members of the House of Commons, and their Servants, &c. Any 
person or persons shall and may at any time commence and prosecute any action or suit in any court of 
record or court of equity or of admiralty, and in all causes matrimonial and testamentary, in any court 
having cognizance of causes matrimonial and testamentary, against any peer or lord of Parliament of 
Great Britain, or against any of the knights, citizens, and burgesses, and the commissioners for shires 
and burghs of the House of Commons of Great Britain for the time being, or against their or any of 
their menial or any other servants, or any other person intitled to the privilege of Parliament of Great 
Britain; and no such action, suit, or any other process or proceeding thereupon shall at any time be 
impeached, stayed, or delayed by or under colour or pretence of any privilege of Parliament. But the 
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Persons of Members of the House of Commons not to be arrested or imprisoned. Provided nevertheless, 
that nothing in this Act shall extend to subject the person of any of the knights, citizens, and burgesses, 
or the commissioners of shires and burghs of the House of Commons of Great Britain for the time 
being, to be arrested or imprisoned upon any such suit or proceedings.” 
Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1914), part II, ch. 4: “[The 
rule of law] means, again, equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary 
law of the land administered by the ordinary Law Courts; the “rule of law” in this sense excludes the 
idea of any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other 
citizens or from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.” 
 
Interparliamentary Union, United Kingdom: House of Commons, available at 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2335.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2013): [Parliamentary privilege] 
applies only to civil proceedings, covers all offences, but protects MPs only from arrest and 
imprisonment. . . . ” 
 
See case of Richard John Bingham, 7th Earl of Lucan (1974). 
Analysis 
While British legislators enjoy immunity from civil arrest, they do not enjoy any protection related to 
criminal proceedings. 
 
Contemporary Ministerial Immunity 
Relevant Provisions 
 
Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1914), part II, ch. 4: “[The 
rule of law] means, again, equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary 
law of the land administered by the ordinary Law Courts; the “rule of law” in this sense excludes the 
idea of any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other 
citizens or from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.” 
 
See case of Chris Hune (2012). 
Analysis 
We found no case or provision granting immunity to ministers for crimes they have committed. As 
Christ Hune was charged with perverting the course of justice while he served as Secretary of State for 
Energy and Climate Change, we conclude that there is no ministerial immunity in the United Kingdom. 
 
Contemporary Chief Executive Immunity 
 Relevant Provisions 
 
Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1914), part II, ch. 4: “[The 
rule of law] means, again, equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary 
law of the land administered by the ordinary Law Courts; the “rule of law” in this sense excludes the 
idea of any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other 
citizens or from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.” 
 
See case of Chris Hune (2012). 
Analysis 
We found no case or provision granting immunity to ministers or the prime minister for crimes they 
have committed. As Chris Hune was charged with perverting the course of justice while he served as 
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, we conclude that there is no immunity from 
criminal prosecution for the British prime minister. 
 
Paraguay 
Paraguay is a presidential system with a bicameral legislature. The Paraguayan Constitution has a strong 
legislative immunity regime and is similar in language, form, and strength to the immunity regimes of Argentina, 
Chile, the Philippines, Peru, and Uruguay. We use the Spanish language version of the Constitution of Paraguay 
from the Political Database of the Americas, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown 
University, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/constitutions/paraguay/paraguay.html (last visited January 
14, 2013). However, we quote an English translation from Dr. Axel Tschentscher, International Constitutional 
Law Project, University of Bern, available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/pa00000_.html (last visited January 
14, 2013). 
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Contemporary Legislative Immunity 
 Relevant Provisions 
 
CONST. PARAGUAY, art. 225: “(1) No charge may be pressed in court against a member of 
Congress for the opinions he may have expressed in discharging his duties.  No senator or 
deputy may be arrested from the day of his election until the end of his term, unless he is 
caught in flagrante delicto in relation to a crime meriting a prison sentence.  In this case, the 
official intervening will place the legislator under house arrest and report the arrest to the 
respective chamber and to a competent judge immediately, to whom he will submit the case 
files as soon as possible. (2) If a court of law orders a pretrial inquest against a senator or a 
deputy, the presiding judge will send a copy of the case files to the respective chamber, which 
will examine the merits of the inquest and, by a two-thirds majority vote, will decide whether 
the senator or deputy involved should be stripped of his immunity in order to stand trial.  If 
the chamber votes against the legislator, it will suspend his immunity so that he may be 
brought to trial.” 
 Analysis 
The provision explicitly states that Paraguayan legislators enjoy immunity from arrest and 
may not be subject to judicial proceedings that proceed beyond a pretrial inquest. A two-thirds 
supermajority vote is required to subject a legislator to detention and trial. As the provision 
does not make any mention of immunity for former legislators, we conclude that such 
protection does not exist. 
 
Contemporary Ministerial Immunity 
 Relevant Provisions 
 
CONST. PARAGUAY, art. 225: “(1) The president of the Republic, the vice president, cabinet 
ministers, justices of the Supreme Court of Justice, the attorney general, the public defender, 
the comptroller and the deputy comptroller general of the Republic, and members of the 
Superior Electoral Court may be forced to undergo impeachment proceedings for malfeasance 
in office, for crimes committed in office, or for common crimes. 
(2) The Chamber of Deputies, by a two-thirds majority, will press the respective charges. The 
Senate, by a two-thirds absolute majority, will conduct a public trial of those charged by the 
Chamber of Deputies and, if appropriate, will declare them guilty for the sole purpose of 
removing them from office.  In cases in which it appears that common crimes have been 
committed, the files on the respective impeachment proceedings will be referred to a 
competent court.” 
 Analysis 
As this provision describes a process of bringing charges against a minister, we assume 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius and conclude that there is no other way of prosecuting a 
minister in Paraguay. Under this provision, a two-thirds majority vote in both houses is 
necessary to suspend the minister from office and refer him/her to a competent court. This 
provision explicitly addresses common crimes and crimes committed in office. As former 
ministers are not mentioned, we assume that they do not enjoy immunity protection. 
 
Contemporary Chief Executive Immunity 
 Relevant Provisions 
 
CONST. PARAGUAY, art. 225: “(1) The president of the Republic, the vice president, cabinet 
ministers, justices of the Supreme Court of Justice, the attorney general, the public defender, 
the comptroller and the deputy comptroller general of the Republic, and members of the 
Superior Electoral Court may be forced to undergo impeachment proceedings for malfeasance 
in office, for crimes committed in office, or for common crimes. 
(2) The Chamber of Deputies, by a two-thirds majority, will press the respective charges. The 
Senate, by a two-thirds absolute majority, will conduct a public trial of those charged by the 
Chamber of Deputies and, if appropriate, will declare them guilty for the sole purpose of 
removing them from office.  In cases in which it appears that common crimes have been 
committed, the files on the respective impeachment proceedings will be referred to a 
competent court.” 
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CONST. PARAGUAY, title V, art. 14: “The office of senator for life will be held by the citizen 
holding the office of president of the Republic at the time of the approval of this Constitution, 
but it will not be extended to any previous president.” 
Analysis 
As article 225 describes a process of bringing charges against a sitting president, we assume 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius and conclude that there is no other way of prosecuting a 
president in Paraguay. Under article 225, a two-thirds majority vote in both houses is 
necessary to suspend the president from office and refer him/her to a competent court. Article 
225 explicitly addresses common crimes and crimes committed in office. Title V, article 14 
gives former presidents the immunity of a senator. 
 
France 
France is a semi-presidential system with a unicameral legislature. It exemplifies a moderate immunity regime 
that is similar in strength and form to those of Indonesia, Panama, and South Korea. A translation of the 
Constitution was accessed from the website of the French National Assembly, available at 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp (last visited January 21, 2013). 
Contemporary Legislative Immunity 
 Relevant Provisions 
 
CONST. FRANCE, art. 26: “No Member of Parliament shall be arrested for a serious crime or 
other major offence, nor shall he be subjected to any other custodial or semi-custodial 
measure, without the authorization of the Bureau of the House of which he is a member. Such 
authorization shall not be required in the case of a serious crime or other major offence 
committed flagrante delicto or when a conviction has become final.” 
 Analysis 
French legislators enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution, which may be waived by the 
Bureau of the National Assembly or Senate. As the respective Bureau is a legislative 
committee, the assent of a majority of legislators in the relevant house is not necessary for the 
prosecution of a member to proceed.  Article 26 explicitly applies to all major offenses, not 
only to those committed in the course of official duties. While a legislator may not be arrested 
or held in custody, article 26 does not prohibit the opening of judicial proceedings against a 
member of the legislature.5  
 
Contemporary Ministerial Immunity 
 
 Relevant Provisions 
CONST. FRANCE, title X, art. 68-1: “Members of the Government shall be criminally liable for 
acts performed in the holding of their office and classified as serious crimes or other major 
offences at the time they were committed.” 
 Analysis 
As title X, article 68-1 explicitly authorizes the prosecution of ministers for major crimes 
committed in the course of their duties—and, implicitly, for all crimes committed outside the 
scope of their duties—without any procedural impediment, ministers do not enjoy immunity 
from criminal prosecution in France. 
 
Contemporary Chief Executive Immunity 
 Relevant Provisions 
 
CONST. FRANCE, title IX, art. 67: “Throughout his term of office the President shall not be 
required to testify before any French Court of law or Administrative authority and shall not be 
the object of any civil proceedings, nor of any preferring of charges, prosecution or 
investigatory measures. All limitation periods shall be suspended for the duration of said term 
of office. All actions and proceedings thus stayed may be reactivated or brought against the 
President one month after the end of his term of office.” 
CONST. FRANCE, title IX, art. 68: “The President of the Republic shall not be removed from 
office during the term thereof on any grounds other than a breach of his duties patently 
incompatible with his continuing in office. Such removal from office shall be proclaimed by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See, also, France: Assemblée nationale, Inter-parliamentary Union, available at 
http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2113.htm (last visited January 21, 2013). 
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Parliament sitting as the High Court. The proposal to convene the High Court adopted by one 
or other of the Houses of Parliament shall be immediately transmitted to the other House 
which shall make its decision known within fifteen days of receipt thereof. The High Court 
shall be presided over by the President of the National Assembly. It shall give its ruling as to 
the removal from office of the President, by secret ballot, within one month. Its decision shall 
have immediate effect. Rulings given hereunder shall require a majority of two thirds of the 
members of the House involved or of the High Court. No proxy voting shall be allowed. Only 
votes in favour of the removal from office or the convening of the High Court shall be 
counted.” 
Analysis 
Under article 67, the President of France may not be charged with any crime while he/she is 
still in office. Under article 68, in order to remove the President, both houses of the legislature 
must assent by a two-thirds majority vote. 
 
Scoring Rubric for United Kingdom, Paraguay, and France: 
Question United King. France Paraguay 
 
1. Is there a procedural impediment that restricts the 








2. Is the assent of a simple majority of legislators in 
one legislative house necessary to authorize the 
detention of a legislator on criminal charges? 
 
[0] [0] [1] 
3. Is the assent of a supermajority of legislators in 
one legislative house necessary to authorize the 
detention of a legislator on criminal charges? 
 
[0] [0] [1] 
4. Do immunity provisions continue to protect 
legislators after their term of office expires? 
 
[0] [0] [0] 
5. Do immunity provisions protect legislators from 
prosecution for the commission of common 
crimes unrelated to official duties? 
 
[0] [1] [1] 
6. Do immunity provisions protect legislators from 
judicial proceedings? 
 
[0] [0] [1] 
7. Is there a procedural impediment that restricts the 
prosecution of a minister on criminal charges? 
 
[0] [0] [1] 
8. Is the assent of a simple majority of legislators in 
one legislative house necessary to authorize the 
prosecution of a minister on criminal charges? 
 
[0] [0] [1] 
9. Is the assent of a supermajority of legislators in 
one legislative house necessary to authorize the 
prosecution of a minister on criminal charges? 
 
[0] [0] [1] 
10. Is the assent of legislators in two legislative 
houses necessary to authorize the prosecution of 
a minister on criminal charges? 
 
[0] [0] [1] 
11. Do criminal immunity provisions continue to 
protect ministers after their term of office 
expires? 
 
[0] [0] [0] 
12. Do criminal immunity provisions protect 
ministers from prosecution for the commission of 
common crimes unrelated to their official duties? 
[0] [0] [1] 
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13. Is there a procedural impediment that restricts the 
prosecution of a chief executive on criminal 
charges? 
 
[0] [1] [1] 
14. Is the assent of a simple majority of legislators in 
one legislative house necessary to authorize the 
prosecution of a chief executive on criminal 
charges? 
 
[0] [1] [1] 
15. Is the assent of a supermajority of legislators in 
one legislative house necessary to authorize the 
prosecution of a chief executive on criminal 
charges? 
 
[0] [1] [1] 
16. Is the assent of legislators in two legislative 
houses necessary to authorize the prosecution of 
a chief executive on criminal charges? 
 
[0] [1] [1] 
17. Do criminal immunity provisions continue to 
apply protect the chief executive after his/her 
term of office expires? 
 
[0] [0] [1] 
18. Do criminal immunity provisions protect the 
chief executive from prosecution for the 
commission of common crimes unrelated to 
his/her official duties? 
[0] [1] [1] 
Immunity Score 0.00 0.39 0.89 
 
